The Arab
Community in Britain: The Absent Presence
By A S BISHTAWI |
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The paper deals
with the nature of Arab presence in Britain, its influence in
various aspects of life in this country, and future prospects. While
the author points out that the overall framework of the picture of
the Arab community has not fundamentally changed over the past ten
years, there have been changes to the details of the picture, having
become more complex and requiring a deeper study.
Bishtawi draws attention to continuing remarkable variations in the
statistics provided by official and independent sources about the
Arab community. Estimates of their number begin with 70 000, and end
up with half a million.
The paper considers the economic dimension of Arab presence in
Britain against the background of Arab-British economic partnership,
being viewed both from the North and South. Information is provided
about trade between Britain and the Arab world. A unique character
is noted, whereby the balance of trade is tilted heavily in
Britain's favour, with an average ratio of 3 to 1. Among Britain's
trade partners are some of the most important oil producers in the
world, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE. Despite competition
from the US, Britain believes that it can still increase its share
in Arab markets. About 50 000 Britons reside in Arab countries,
mostly in the Gulf States (nearly 45 000).
While no accurate figures are available about the value of direct
Arab investments in Britain at present, Bishtawi believes that they
are less than they had been in the late 1980s. A big change has
affected, however, their structure as private investments have
replaced government or quasi-governmental investments. The reduction
of direct Arab investments in Britain is attributed partly to the
consequences of the war to liberate Kuwait, coupled with the general
drop in oil prices and the deficit in the balance of payments of
Gulf states. It is estimated that even with the recent rise in oil
prices, an average price of $20 per barrel will not be sufficient to
rebuild the financial reserves which existed in the late 1980s.
Against such a background, the paper moves on to consider "the
economic picture of Arab presence in Britain". Here, it notes that
only a little proportion of the overall trade between the Arab
countries and Britain goes through the Arab community in Britain, or
through Arab companies operating in Britain. This is attributed to a
number of factors, including the relatively short duration of Arab
presence in this country, and their marginal influence in affecting
an increased control of part of this trade in their hands. The most
important factors cited for this state of affairs are, however, the
direct contact which Britain enjoys with a number of important Arab
states thanks to its old ties with them, and the dominance of the
"agency" aspect in Arab economies, thus negating the need for a
mediator residing in London, for example.
A better level of participation by the Arab community in the
transfer of Arab investments to Britain, such as property
investments, is only reflected on the Arab community through a
limited number of jobs in small banks and investment companies which
are not normally labour intensive.
A small number of Arab companies with big capitalisation exist in
Britain, but most of them are of small size and operate in specific
fields, such as property marketing and services, tourism and
marketing sectors. These, however, only provide a limited number of
jobs. The Gulf war, the decline in oil revenues and reduced spending
power of a large section of Gulf citizens, affected these companies,
curtailing their activities or forcing them to close down. The end
of the civil war in Lebanon and the restoration of stability there
also reduced the number of Lebanese-owned companies in the services
and foods sector. Media and advertising institutions were also
active in London, providing a significant number of jobs. But these
institutions have been going through a period of retreat for three
years now.
The paper draws attention to the sharp variation in the general
economic scene of the Arab community in Britain, with a number of
billionaires and millionaires, and some of the well off who are
considered to belong to the upper strata of the middle class. A
large proportion of the community, however, is made up of employees
and wage earners who suffer financial problems that are not much
different from those faced by Britons in similar conditions,
especially if they are burdened with heavy mortgages. Many Arabs
also live on social benefits.
The problem of identity is then discussed by the paper. While Arabs
are generally able to integrate in the societies where they live
with noticeable ease, something in their oriental character always
pulls them towards their homeland. Bishtawi states that he cannot
therefore imagine someone would want to live in an non-Arab country
unless there was an economic, political or social reason, or a
combination of these reasons and others, which forced him to
migrate. Some Arabs in Britain, therefore, continue to hope for a
return one day to their homeland, thus perpetuating a state of
uncertainty.
With proper economic conditions and receding hope of an improvement
in conditions back home, the immigrant communities gradually begin
to transform, over a relatively long period, into resident
communities. This was the case for a large proportion of Lebanese
and Palestinians in North and South America, and also for Yemenis
who resided in Cardiff, Birmingham and other places in Britain. But
it is still early for this to happen for a significant part of Arabs
who came to Britain more recently.
The case of the Arab community doe not differ much from that of
others, such as the Jews who came from Germany, the people of Hong
Kong, Indians and Pakistanis. Most of these people came mainly
because of difficult political, social and economic conditions in
their countries. Their return is no longer possible, even if the
economic conditions back home improve, because the new generation
has got used to life in Britain. This is what is happening to a
large number of the sons and daughters of Arabs in Britain.
Finally, Bishtawi gives a summary which includes a number of
personal observations about Arab presence in Britain. He believes
that as far as the influence exercised by a certain community is
concerned, their numbers are not as important as the level of
organisation they possess. A priority on the level of Arab action
must be given to helping the new generation to strengthen ties with
their roots before being totally assimilated in British society.
Social, cultural and educational objectives must be given priority
over political objectives, postponing thoughts of Arab unity until
it is achieved in the Arab world.
Bishtawi also expresses the opinion that more emphasis and effort
must be put into setting up communal centres in the areas where
Arabs are concentrated, i.e. consolidating the pyramid's base rather
than its head (the latter being the elitist approach of Arab efforts
at present). There is a need for a proper infrastructure for
providing services to enhance the coherence of Arab communities.
While there are no fears of threats to the ethnic communities in
Britain at present, due to the strong growth of British economy,
coordination is important and ought to start now, in preparation for
any contingency in future.
Translated by Salam Ali
A synopsis of the paper presented by A.S Bishtawi, head of the
Economics and Information Technology Section in Al Hayat Arab daily,
to the 3rd Conference of the Arab Community (16-17 October 1999)
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